Abstract-The primary goal of compressed sensing and (non-adaptive) combinatorial group testing is to recover a sparse vector x from an underdetermined set of linear equations Φx = y. Both problems entail solving Φx = y given Φ and y but they use different models of arithmetic, different models of randomness models for Φ, and different guarantees upon the solution x and the class of signals from which x is drawn. In [1] , Lipton introduced a model for error correction where the channel is computationally bounded, subject to standard cryptographic assumptions, and produces the error vector x that must be found and then corrected. This has been extended in [2] , [3] to create more efficient schemes against polynomial and logspace bounded channels. Inspired by these results in error correction, we view compressed sensing and combinatorial group testing as an adversarial process, where Mallory the adversary produces the vector x to be measured, with limited information about the matrix Φ. We define a number of computationally bounded models for Mallory and show that there are significant gains (in the minimum number of measurements) to be had by relaxing the model from adversarial to computationally or information-theoretically bounded, and not too much (in some cases, nothing at all) is lost by assuming these models over oblivious or statistical models. We also show that differences in adversarial power give rise to different lower bounds for the number of measurements required to defeat such an adversary. By contrast we show that randomized one pass log space streaming Mallory is almost as powerful as a fully adversarial one for group testing while for compressed sensing such an adversary is as weak as an oblivious one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group testing was introduced by Dorfman in his seminal 1943 paper to identify soldiers in WWII who had syphilis [4] . Combinatorial group testing 1 has found applications in drug and DNA library screening (the literature is large, see [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and references thereof), multiple access control protocols [9] , [10] , live 1 In this paper we will only consider non-adaptive schemes.
baiting of DoS attackers [11] , data forensics [12] and data streams [13] , among others. The reader is referred to the standard monograph on group testing for more details [14] .
Compressed sensing is much more recent. It was introduced in 2006 by [15] , [16] as a method for acquiring signals in a "compressed" fashion and then reconstructing good (i.e., sparse) approximations to the signals from those observations. The problem has many practical applications from analog-to-digital conversion [17] , [18] , [19] , novel optical device design [20] , [21] , [22] , pooling designs for rare allele detection [23] , and video acquisition [24] , to cite a few examples.
Even though they were introduced more than half a century apart, compressed sensing and (non-adaptive) combinatorial group testing are similar. Their primary goal is to recover a sparse vector x from an underdetermined set of linear equations Φx = y. Both problems include solving Φx = y given Φ and y but they use different models of arithmetic, different randomness models for Φ and different guarantees upon the solution x and the class of signals from which it is drawn. Compressed sensing attempts to recover a sparse signal x ∈ R N from a small number of linear measurements Φx. The signal x is usually assumed to be composed of a "head", the k largest entries (in magnitude) of the vector, supported on a small number of indices, and a tail whose 1 or 2 norm is small. The goal is to recover a close approximation 2 x to x from the measurements Φx. In the combinatorial group testing model the binary matrix Φ represents a pooling design and the goal is to recover a small set (of size d) of "defective" elements from a set of tests Φx. (Here x ∈ {0, 1} N .) In the group testing model, a test fails if any items in the group being tested are defective, so the matrix vector product Φx is done using boolean OR.
Compressed sensing and group testing share another similarity, which is a limited range of types of models that generate the input signal x. Existing models typically fall into one of two categories:
• Adversarial or "for all" models. An ambitious goal is to successfully recover all signals that satisfy a certain geometric property. In compressed sensing this usually corresponds to a bound on size of the support of the head, and an 1 -or 2 -norm bound on the tail, although more restrictive models on the form of the support set have been studied. 3 In combinatorial group testing settings these correspond to restrictions on the Hamming weight of the signal.
• Probabilistic or "for each" models. These are two slightly different cases. One goal (that of the "for each" model in compressed sensing) is to recover a fixed, arbitrary vector with high probability over the construction of the matrix Φ. A similar goal is to successfully recover a random signal from a specified distribution with high probability over the signal, which has been considered in compressed sensing. Statistical models that have been considered include the uniform distribution or graphical models for the k-sparse head [26] , [27] , [25] , possibly combined with i.i.d. Gaussian noise for the tail [26] . Somewhat surprisingly, neither the "for each" model nor the random signal model has received much attention in the (non-adaptive) group testing setting, to the best of our knowledge. 4 Both these extremal types of models have benefits and drawbacks. The advantage of the "for all" model is that it places minimal assumptions on the signal, which typically implies that schemes developed in this model also work in more benign models. The wide applicability of the "for all" model comes at a cost, and usually implies that positive results are harder to achieve. More importantly, it is highly unlikely that a natural process would generate worst-case signals. On the other hand, the "for each" model typically leads to quantitatively stronger positive results but is not applicable in as many situations. Schemes that specify particular distributions on the input tend to be specialized, and it is debatable if a natural signal producing process would be oblivious to Φ, or that a natural process would follow a simple, fully specified random process. One of the goals of this paper is to develop a model for signals in such a way that it captures natural process and the same time has the benefits of both the "for all" model (wider applicability of the schemes developed) and the "for each" model (stronger positive results).
While schemes in the "for each" model are the easiest to construct, in many situations a "for each" guarantee may not be sufficient. One problem that arises is that of feedback. In real-world applications the measurement matrix, Φ, will be fixed and used to recover many signals. This is acceptable if we can prove a "for all" guarantee on the matrix Φ, but if Φ only satisfies a "for each" guarantee problems may arise. One of the simplest types of problems is when future signals may depend on the measurements of current signals. As a simple example exhibiting feedback, imagine a vector x indicating the monthly sales counts of items in a store. The management may wish to keep a sketch, Φx, of the best selling items. 5 The store may then choose to update its layout or sales strategy depending on the result of the sketch. 6 Next month's sales will be influenced by this updated layout or strategy, and hence are dependent on Φx. A more adversarial situation could arise as follows. An attacker launches a missile at a ship. The ship, using some form of compressed sensing radar [31] , detects the incoming missile and takes evasive action. The ship's evasive action is viewed by the attacker, and the attacker can adjust his second attack accordingly. Since the ship cannot be expected to choose a new measurement matrix, Φ, between successive attacks, the second attack may not be detected using a matrix that only satisfies a "for each" guarantee. 7 In both these cases, successive signals are subject to some sort of feedback. Signals that depend on some sort of feedback arise naturally, but these signals are not covered by the "for each" model.
These types of signals are not completely unrestrained, however. They fit naturally into a bounded adversarial model. We point out as well, that even if the attacker cannot be modeled as a simple process, the amount of information the attacker receives from viewing the target's evasive action is limited, so the attacker's view of Φx is naturally modeled as having to pass through an "information-theoretic bottleneck."
When considering intermediate signal models, it is 5 Suppose the sketch indicates that antihistamines are selling quite well, but sunscreen is doing poorly. 6 In the example of the previous footnote, the manager suspects a high pollen count, which is confirmed through some arbitrary process involving checking the pollen count online or in a weather forecast. The store moves the sunscreen to a back shelf and, to be safe, also bug spray, and orders more facial tissues. 7 In practice the measurement matrix, Φ, is often built into hardware and is extremely difficult to change on the fly.
instructive to consider the landscape in a related field: coding theory. Compressed sensing and group testing are closely related to coding, the parallel is most easily seen by viewing Φ as the parity-check matrix of a linear code, and the signal x as the error pattern [32] . Coding theory has a worst-case (for all) model pioneered by Hamming, as well as a probabilistic ("for each") model introduced by Shannon. Unlike compressed sensing and group testing, coding theory also has a rich literature on intermediate models. One such example is the arbitrarily varying channel [33] . Another example, that is more in line with computational thinking, is the notion of computationally bounded adversaries. In [1] , Lipton introduced a model for error correction where the channel is computationally bounded, and is subject to standard cryptographic assumptions. This has been extended in [2] , [3] to create more efficient schemes against polynomial and logspace bounded channels. Note that the "for all" model corresponds to a computationally unbounded adversarial model while the probabilistic models correspond to much weaker computationally bounded or oblivious adversaries.
Given the importance of compressed sensing and group testing, we believe it is important to develop an understanding of their properties under more than just the most extreme classes of signal. The primary goal of this paper is to initiate the study of intermediate models for both compressed sensing and group testing:
• Computationally bounded models. The goal here is to recover a signal generated by a computationally bounded adversary such that the signal must be recovered with high probability over the construction of Φ. This corresponds to the computationally bounded channels in coding theory. Like the bounded channel model for error correcting codes, we often imagine that the input for these problems is generated by some natural process; not necessarily powerful, but also not necessarily wellbehaved, and, in particular, not necessarily independent of the measurement matrix Φ. Furthermore, computational conditions are arguably more natural for algorithms than geometric or statistical ones: a geometric model is useful mathematically, but does not give insight into how difficult it is to choose problematic vectors. Statistical models put the burden on the problem designer to produce a natural model, if one even exists. In contrast, a computationally bounded model is quite broad. As a special case we consider the streaming adversary where one is only allowed a single pass over Φ and uses only logarithmic amount of space.
• Information theoretically bounded models. Another way to have a spectrum of adversaries it to characterize recoverable signals in terms of information content. Here, the goal to recover all signals whose mutual information with Φ is small. Note that the "for each" model corresponds to zero mutual information and the "for all" model corresponds to the full information case.
A second goal of this paper is to compare the compressed sensing and group testing frameworks. On the one hand group testing is an easier task than compressed sensing as we only need to handle binary vectors (and there is no measurement noise 8 ). On the other hand each measurement gives very little information about x as each measurement in group testing is just an OR of the bits). Our metric of comparison is the minimum number of measurements required to recover the signal or the defective set, as in both problems a primary goal is to minimize the number of measurements (the rows of Φ) necessary for recovery.
Let k denote both the size of the "head" of the signal and of the defective set. Then, if we compare group testing to compressed sensing with 1 / 1 error guarantees, it would seem that compressed sensing is more powerful as O(k log(N/k)) measurements suffice [34] to perform (even) "for all" 1 compressed sensing while one needs Ω(k 2 log k N ) measurements [35] , [36] , [37] to recover k sparse binary vectors by group testing. On the other hand, if we are interested in 2 / 2 error bounds in compressed sensing, then we must use Ω(N ) measurements in the "for all" setting [38] . By contrast, group testing only needs O(k 2 log(N/k)) measurements [14] and thus, compressed sensing seems harder. 9 Only O(k log(N/k)) measurements are needed [39] in the "for each" model for 2 / 2 recovery, which is optimal [34] , and far away from the lower bound of Ω(N ) in the "for all" model. Since this is the main gap between the "for all" and "for each" for compressed sensing, and we are interested in interpolating between these cases, we will consider only 2 / 2 compressed sensing for the rest of the paper. Furthermore, 2 / 2 norms are the most natural for signal processing as the 2 norm squared is the signal energy and the error can be expressed in terms of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), a standard metric.
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A. Our results
Our results are summarized in Table I . We begin with our results on the "for each" or probabilistic models for group testing. We show that O(d log N ) measurements suffice to recover a d-sparse binary vector x in the "for each" model as well as the case when x is generated by the well-known binary symmetric channel (each bit is one independently with probability d/N ). This shows that (a) we gain in the number of measurements for group testing when we go from the "for all" to "for each" model and (b) group testing and (both 1 / 1 and 2 / 2 ) compressed sensing have similar complexities in the "for each" model. A natural follow-up question is whether we can distinguish between group testing and 2 / 2 compressed sensing by an adversary that is weaker than the "for all" model (where we know there is a gap).
Somewhat surprisingly we are able to show that a randomized one pass O(log N ) space streaming adversary suffices to distinguish between group testing and 2 / 2 compressed sensing. In particular, we are able to show that O(k log(n/k)) measurements suffice against such an adversary for 2 / 2 compressed sensing, i.e., in some sense such an adversary is just as weak as a "for each" adversary. We use lower bounds in communication complexity to show upper bounds for recovery against a streaming adversary. On the other hand, we show that for group testing a randomized one pass log space streaming adversary is almost as powerful as a "for all" adversary by showing that Ω(d 2 / log d) measurement are needed to perform group testing against such an adversary.
Using limited-wise hash functions, we can de-randomize this result to show that Ω(d 2 / log d) measurements are necessary to recover a d sparse binary vector against a deterministic O(log d log N ) space bounded adversary (with no a priori limit on the number of passes).
Finally, we show that for information-theoretically bounded adversaries with O(log N ) bits of mutual information do no better than the oblivious model for both compressed sensing and group testing.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
There are three key components to both group testing and sparse signal recovery designs: the measurement matrix Φ, the unknown sample or signal x, and the observations y. We assume that x is of length N and that the matrix Φ has dimensions m × N . In the combinatorial group testing literature, the number of rows m is typically denoted by t for tests but we will stick with the sparse signal recovery notation. The final parameter of interest in either problem is the number of defectives d that we seek (for group testing) or the sparsity k (for signal recovery). For this parameter, we use the convention of the two separate bodies of literature and express the number of measurements m in terms of d and N for group testing and k and N for sparse signal recovery. One important distinction between group testing and sparse recovery signals is that for group testing, the signal x is a binary vector with d 1s, while for sparse recovery, the signal x ∈ R N consists of two pieces: x k , the k-largest entries in absolute value (called the "head" of the vector), and x − x k , the remaining N − k entries (called the "tail" of the vector).
Since we are considering these problems in an adversarial context, we will name the process generating inputs x Mallory. She will take on various powers throughout the paper.
B. Models for Mallory
We consider several models for Mallory.
• Binary symmetric channel: Entries in the signal x are 1 with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p, independent of the matrix Φ (analogous to the error correcting code setting in which bits in the encoded message are flipped with probability p). We consider this model for combinatorial group testing only and note that in this model, the number of defectives present in the signal is a random variable.
• Oblivious: Mallory cannot see the matrix Φ and generates the signal x independent from Φ. In the combinatorial group testing problem, Mallory chooses a set of size d to be the defective set. For sparse signal recovery, this model is equivalent to the "for each" signal model.
• Information-Theoretic: Mallory's output has bounded mutual information with the matrix. To cast this in a computational light, we say that an algorithm M is (log-)information-theoretically-
, where the output of M 1 consists of at most O(log(|x|)) bits. Lemma 1 shows that this requirement can be expressed as a bound on the success probability of an oblivious adversary. We distinguish this case from the oblivious case because it provides a natural abstraction in a number of settings. As mentioned in the introduction, in a situation with feedback, it is reasonable to assume that an adversary (powerful or not) might only see a few bits about Φ based on our actions. This might also arise in a situation where a space-bounded streaming adversary does not start to generate x until it has seen all of Φ. This is obviously a much weaker adversary that a general information-theoretic bounded one, but it comes up naturally.
• Streaming log-space: Mallory can stream over Φ but only has log space with which to store information about Φ and to compute an error message. In contrast to the information theoretic model above, which puts restrictions on the amount of mutual information between the signal and Φ, this is a computational restriction. A logspace streaming adversary is the natural "weakest" computationally bounded adversary, and thus is a reasonable place to start our analysis. Additionally, it has practical applications: both the sensor example and the error correction example above could fit into this model as well.
• Adversarial: Mallory has full computational power. We begin with a simple observation (proven in the full paper) about the success probability of randomized algorithms. For a randomized algorithm A with failure probability > 0, if an omnipotent adversary sees the seed r for A before choosing the input x, then A will fail. However, if the adversary has limited space, success is still possible: Lemma 1. Pick = (N ), and fix 0 < α < 1. Let A be any randomized algorithm which takes input x ∈ {0, 1} N , r ∈ {0, 1} m , which "succeeds" with probability 1 − . Then for any information theoretically bounded algorithm M with space , A(M (r), r) succeeds with probability at least min {1 − α, 1 − / log(α/)} over the choice of r.
III. COMBINATORIAL GROUP TESTING
The goal of group testing is to identify a set of d "defective" elements from a population of size N . This is accomplished by creating a pooling design, where each element is placed in multiple "pools" and each pool is tested separately. A pool will fail if it contains at least one defective element. The primary goal in this scenario is to minimize the number of pools, which is equivalent to minimizing the number of tests needed. It is customary to identify the set of defectives as a vector, x, of weight d in {0, 1} N , and a pool as a vector in {0, 1} N identifying which elements are in the pool. The entire design, consisting of m pools, can be written concisely as a matrix Φ ∈ {0, 1} m×N . The outcome of the m tests then corresponds to the matrix product Φx, where the matrix product is computed using boolean AND an OR, since each test fails if any element in that pool is defective.
Combinatorial group testing schemes have focused on developing pooling designs that are robust against "worst-case" (adversarial) distribution of defectives. In particular, this means, that the group testing scheme must be able to correctly identify any subset of size d from a population of size N . In this worst-case adversarial model, explicit schemes are known which make m = O(d 2 log(N )) tests [40] , and it is known that any scheme must have m = Ω ( d 2 log(N )/ log(d)) [41] .
We begin by exhibiting simple schemes requiring O(d log(N )) measurements in the random and the obliv-ious models. The rather large gap between the upper bound of d log(N ) measurements in the random and oblivious cases, and the lower bound of d 2 log(N ) measurements in the "for all" case indicates a need for intermediate models. As a step towards filling this gap, we consider the similar case where x is generated by a information-theoretically bounded adversary, and by computationally bounded adversaries.
Our results show that moving from the restrictive "for each" model to the more general space bounded adversary does not result in a decrease in efficiency. On the other hand, we show lower bounds even for very weak computationally bounded adversaries. We show that any scheme where Φ has m = O(d 2 / log(d)) rows will fail against a randomized log-space adversary with one-pass streaming access to Φ, or by a deterministic adversary with O(log N log m) space. As we will see in Section IV, this contrasts with the sparse recovery case, where a logspace streaming adversary can be defeated with the optimal number of measurements.
A. Binary symmetric channel
In this section, we give a concrete construction of a group testing design which recovers a random set of defectives with high probability over the choice of defectives. We consider a model where each item in the population is defective with probability d/N , independent of all other items. Thus, the expected number of defective items is d. In the setting of error-correcting codes, this corresponds to switching from Hamming's adversarial model of noise to Shannon's binary symmetric channel. The idea is simple: divide up domain (length N ) into N/t chunks of size t each. Then create a block diagonal matrix, where we use a standard x-disjunct matrix for each of N/t chunks. The proof is in the full paper, where we also show that this scheme is nearly optimal: Lemma 2. Any (non-adaptive) group testing scheme to recover from error rate d/N in the random model with
B. Oblivious adversary
We also consider the oblivious model, in which an adversary Mallory, with no knowledge of the design matrix Φ, chooses a pattern of defectives to create
N . For any x she chooses, we demand that with high probability over the construction of Φ, x is recoverable from Φx and Φ. The construction in Proposition 1, post-multiplied by a random permutation matrix, works in the oblivious setting with the same argument and the same number of measurements. In the full paper we show that using a random matrix, we may correct the log(d/δ) factor at the cost of switching from log(N/d) to log N : Proposition 2. For any distribution of vectors x ∈ {0, 1} N , where Pr[|Supp(x)| > d] < δ, there is a distribution of design matrices Φ with O(d log(N )) rows such that with probability at least 1 − 2δ over the choice of Φ, and the choice of x, the signal x can be exactly recovered from Φx and Φ, using boolean arithmetic.
Corollary 1.
A m×n matrix where each entry is 1 with probability 1/d, and 0 with probability 1−1/d represents a pooling design against an oblivious adversary which recovers any weight d input probability at least 1 − δ over the choice of the matrix, where m = 4d log N δ .
C. Group testing against an information-theoretically bounded adversary
The error probability in Proposition 2 along with Lemma 1 immediately implies that a logspace information theoretically bounded adversary with access to the a matrix Φ drawn from the distribution described above will also not succeed: Corollary 2. Let Φ be a matrix so that each entry is 1 independently with probability 1/d, with m = O(d log(N )) rows. For any information-theoretically bounded algorithm M with O(log N ) space which sees Φ and then generates x, x can be recovered exactly from Φx and Φ with probability at least 2/3.
D. Lower bounds against computationally bounded adversaries
In this section, we show that the good news in group testing stops at oblivious or information-theoretically bounded adversaries. For even very simple computationally bounded adversaries, O(d 2 / log d) measurements are needed. We begin with a randomized adversary and then later show how it can be de-randomized. There is a algorithm with O(log(N )) space which streams over the rows of Φ and outputs a set T ⊂ [N ] so that |T | ≤ d and so that the characteristic vector x of T satisfies the following property: there is some i ∈ T so that if y is the characteristic vector of T ∪ {i}, Φx = Φy. In particular, accurate recovery of x from Φx is impossible.
To prove Theorem 1, we describe in Algorithm 1 a one pass low space adversary who streams over Φ rowby-row and outputs a list of indices which will determine the set T of defectives.
Algorithm 1: A logspace streaming adversary which outputs a set T of defectives which will resist recovery.
1) Independently at random output each of the N column indices with probability p = Θ log m N , where will be chosen in the proof. Note that this step is independent of the matrix Φ. (i) Count the number of ones y in row r;
(ii) Remember the first column j = i such that
Otherwise, do nothing. It is easy to check that the above algorithm can be implemented in one pass and O(log N ) space.
The complete proof of correctness can be found in the full paper. The basic idea is that this adversary will take care of the "heavy" rows (those with many ones) and the "light" rows separately. The goal is to choose large enough so that enough of the heavy rows are covered, and small enough that not more than d indices are selected. This is possible as long as m = O(d 2 / log(d)). Algorithm 1 can be de-randomized to produce an equivalent deterministic low space algorithm. Note that in a the setting of a deterministic adversary, we will allow the adversary to make multiple passes over Φ.
Theorem 2. For any matrix Φ with O(d 2 / log(d)) rows, there is a deterministic algorithm with space O(log m log N ) which generates x ∈ {0, 1} N with at most d nonzeroes so that for some y ∈ {0, 1} N with at most d non-zeros, Φx = Φy. In particular, recovery of x is impossible.
The proof can be found in the full paper.
IV. SPARSE SIGNAL RECOVERY
In sparse signal recovery, we wish to recover a signal x from measurements Φx with as little error as possible.
We will use the notation that x = y + z, where y is the head (the largest k terms) and z is the tail. In this section, we suppose an adversary who generates the tail z, while the head y is assumed to be worst-case. 10 The strongest possible bound on error between the original signal x and the recovered approximationx is an 2 / 2 requirement:
This bound is achievable with m = O(k log(N/k)) (see [39] ) in the oblivious model, meeting a lower bound [34] . On the other hand, [38] show that in the adversarial model, (1) is impossible unless N = O(m).
In this section, we show that even when relaxing the adversary to the logspace (information theoretically bounded) model or logspace streaming model, (1) is still attainable with an optimal number of rows, circumventing the lower bound in [38] .
A. Information-Theoretically Bounded Adversaries
In this section we consider an adversary who must pass through a log(N )-space information-theoretic bottleneck. The Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) is a useful criterion for generating matrices for sparse recovery: In [38] it is shown that, when Φ has the Restricted Isometry Property, a sufficient condition for unique recovery against an oblivious adversary is that no "tail" z is very stretched by Φ. This implies that unique recovery is possible with 2 / 2 error as long as Mallory cannot find z so that Φz 2 ≥ Cz 2 . From the fact that for several standard ensembles (Gaussian, Bernoulli, etc) an oblivious adversary is very unlikely to find such z (see for example [42] ), Lemma 1 implies that neither is Mallory. This does not imply that efficient recovery is possible, but in fact several existing (efficient) algorithms will work. Many algorithms ( [43] , [44] ) recover an exactly k-sparse x in the adversarial setting which are stable in the 2 / 2 sense against some post-measurement noise. That is, if x is k-sparse, given Φx + e, such algorithms recoverx so that
This immediately gives an algorithm which works against an information-theoretically bounded adversary with logarithmic space.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Φ is chosen to have independent Bernoulli or Gaussian entries. Suppose A is an algorithm which recovers an exactly k-sparse vector x from Φx + e so that (2) holds. Then A will succeed with high probability on any vector x generated by a logspace information theoretically bounded adversary with access to Φ.
A downside of Proposition 3 is that we would like to use a more combinatorial approach, for several reasons. First, these schemes tend to use sparser matrices and have faster recovery times. Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, we will see in Section IV-B that combinatorial algorithms will extend to work against a logspace streaming adversary as well as an information theoretically bounded adversary.
Our construction is based on several constructions in the literature, including [39] and [45] . At a high level, the idea is to create Φ out of O(log N ) hash matrices with O(k) buckets each. Additionally, each nonzero element in the hash matrix is subject to a random sign flip. With high probability, at most one element of the head is hashed into each bucket, and the other (smaller) elements in the bucket are likely to cancel each other out. The savings in the number of rows and the error probability over other hashing-type algorithms comes from the recursive nature of the reconstruction algorithm. To recover, a block of hash matrices is used to identify the top half of the heavy hitters, which are then subtracted off. The process is repeated with the remaining hash matrices. The algorithm itself and a proof of its correctness can be found in the full paepr.
B. A Streaming Adversary
In this section, give a combinatorial algorithm that succeeds against a logspace streaming adversary. See the full paper for a full discussion of the algorithm. Theorem 3. Suppose x = y + z, where y is an arbitrary k-sparse vector and z is generated synchronously by an adversary with O(log(N )) space streaming over the rows of a matrix Φ. Suppose that k = o(N/(log(N/k) log N )) and k = Ω(log N ). There is a distribution on m × N matrices Φ with m = O( −1 k log(N/k)) measurements and an efficient recovery algorithm which returnsx so that x −x 2 ≤ O()x − x k 2 with probability at least 2/3.
Briefly, the idea is that as Mallory streams over the rows, she only outputs a few entries relevant to that row, for most of the rows. She outputs the other entries of the tail based only on her (limited) memory. Because the relevant analysis is resilient to a constant fraction of errors in each block, we recover from her informed outputs, and we may consider only those that she is trying to remember.
We allow Mallory unlimited computation while inspecting any one row, but her space requirements mean she can only carry log(N ) bits with her between rows. We cast this as a communication problem for players Alice and Bob, who are trying to solve an augmented indexing indexing problem. Given an instance of augmented indexing, we construct a matrix Φ so that if Mallory could find a problematic tail for the recovery algorithm, we could construct a solution for augmented indexing violating a known bound in communication complexity. The description of the algorithm and the proof of correctness can be found in the full paper.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We present several new models for signal generation in combinatorial group testing and sparse recovery. These models capture the many natural situations in which the signal has a weak dependence on the measurement matrix, or when subsequent signals one observes have some weak dependence on the measurement matrix or upon the measurements obtained. It is often more natural to assume that the process generating this signal is either computationally bounded, or has limited information about the measurement matrix Φ than to assume that this process conforms to particular geometric requirements or follows a certain distribution. We show that there are significant gains (in the minimum number of measurements required) to be had by relaxing the model from adversarial to computationally or information-theoretically bounded, and not too much (in some cases, nothing at all) is lost by assuming these models over oblivious or statistical models. We also show that in the group testing case, there is a difference between information-theoretically bounded and computationally bounded (streaming) models, which contrasts the situation in sparse recovery.
One model we have not discussed is that of a polynomial-time bounded adversary, with cryptographic assumptions, which is a natural next step. It is perhaps of more practical use to consider sparse recovery or group testing against such an adversary. DMS 0354600 and NSF DMS 0510203. ACG and MJS have been partially supported by DARPA ONR N66001-06-1-2011. AR is supported by NSF CAREER grant CCF-0844796.
